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This article is based on a study supported by IMA’s Foundation for Applied Research (FAR).
By S. Mark Young, James J. Gong, and Wim A. Van der Stede
Despite an ever-changing entertainment landscape, motion pictures are still the
cornerstone of the U.S. entertainment industry with consumers spending nearly $50 bil-
lion in 2008 to watch U.S. movies in a variety of formats. In the February and March
2008 issues of Strategic Finance, we discussed the cost side of the motion picture indus-
try, focusing on how films are produced and marketed. In 2008, the average feature film
cost the major studios $72 million to produce and $37 million to promote.
In this article, we discuss how the major film studios are constantly changing their
revenue-generating models to extend the economic life of a film by adapting to new
competitive forces and technological changes. After all, studios need to think beyond
the box office since more than four-fifths of a film’s revenue typically comes from home
video, pay TV, and other downstream sources. The Foundation for Applied Research
(FAR) of the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA®) sponsored our research
(see FAR Research Study, p. 39). Let’s begin.
THE BUSINESS OF
MAKING MONEY
WITH MOVIES
Until the early 1970s, consumers in the U.S. had only a
few ways in which they could enjoy a movie: They could
see it during its theatrical release, attend a film festival or
revival, or view it long after theatrical release on one of
the three major television networks (ABC, NBC, or CBS).
During this era, the main sources of revenues for the stu-
dios came from theatrical release, international sales, and
network television.
In 1972, the options for consumers increased when
Home Box Office (HBO) became the first cable television
network to offer a subscription service. HBO’s offerings
included recent and well-known films, sporting events,
and original programming. A truly significant technologi-
cal innovation occurred in 1975 when Sony Corporation
introduced Betamax, the first home video system. The
Victor Company of Japan (JVC) quickly entered the mar-
ket, offering the VHS format (video home system) as an
alternative. Ultimately, VHS became the industry stan-
dard. In 1977, the Video Club of America opened the first
video store from which movies could be purchased, and
George Atkinson opened the first video rental store. Home
video provided new opportunities for the studios to gen-
erate more revenues from their existing film libraries.
Today the viewing options for consumers and, hence,
the revenue streams for the studios have increased signifi-
cantly as content delivery systems continue to evolve.
Since studios rely on a variety of revenue streams, new
technologies allow the industry to remain viable in tur-
bulent times. Nevertheless, the theatrical release of a
movie is still the single most important indicator of suc-
cess and offers a critical means by which to evaluate
industry trends. Table 1 shows the various revenue
streams, beginning with the domestic box office. Let’s
now look at factors affecting the box office.
The Domestic Box Office
Without a doubt, opening box office performance (and
cumulative box office receipts to a lesser extent) is still
the critical indicator of a film’s success. As we pointed out
in “The Business of Selling Movies” in the March 2008
issue of Strategic Finance, the level at which the film per-
forms on opening weekend (Friday through Sunday)
influences all downstream contracts regarding digital ver-
satile disk (DVD), international, network, satellite, and
cable television, as well as Internet and mobile sales.
Depending on ticket sales, movies stay at the box office
from three weeks, like the movie Gigli, to eight months,
like Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers.
According to Boxofficemojo.com, in 2009, overall box
office performance reached an all-time high of $10.6 billion,
thanks in large part to five huge blockbusters: Transform-
ers: Revenge of the Fallen, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood
Prince, Up, The Twilight Saga: New Moon, and Avatar.
This is the first time ever that the domestic box office
exceeded $10 billion. While this number is portrayed as
good news, the studios are still concerned. These box
office numbers mask several critical factors related to the
current theater-going audience.
First, the studios are under enormous pressure to create
blockbusters to obtain these kinds of results. It’s no acci-
dent that the top three movies listed above cost between
$210 million and $250 million, not including about 
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Table 1: Windows of Exhibition for Movies
SOURCES WINDOW
Domestic Box Office (Theaters) Initial theatrical release of three weeks to eight months
Home Video (VHS/DVD) Exclusive window of only six weeks before pay-per-view
Pay-Per-View Exclusive window of from two to six weeks before premium channels
Premium Pay Channels (Pay TV) Exclusive window for up to 18 months before network and cable TV
Network (free) and Cable TV Up to 12 to 18 months before syndication
Syndication 60 months on either network television or cable network
Note: Omitted from the distribution channels and windows are foreign sales, hotels, airlines, college campuses, the video game sec-
tor, consumer products merchandising, and theme parks. Foreign sales usually begin after the initial theatrical release in the U.S. Each
territory has different windows for different channels. Video games based on blockbuster movies sometimes earn equivalent rev-
enues as the theatrical releases.
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$100 million in marketing costs. If such movies had failed,
the studios would be in dire straits. Also, over time, the
percentage of people who actually go to a movie theater
has declined from a high of 65% of the population in
1930 (before television) to about 10% over the last several
decades and to 9.9% in 2009. In 2009, however, atten-
dance was up by about 10% over the previous year, and
some believe that the recession caused many to go to the
movies as an escapist route. Box office attendance has
been decreasing for several reasons—chief among them
the smorgasbord of entertainment options, such as video
games, music, movies, television, and user-generated
content (as might be viewed on social network sites) in a
variety of formats and through innovative methods of
delivery that include online and mobile devices.
These easy-to-access options compete with the motion
picture industry for consumer dollars—a scenario very dif-
ferent from that of the 1930s when consumers had no other
option but to attend a theater if they wanted to see a movie.
Today approximately three out of four people prefer to
watch movies in locations other than a theater because their
satisfaction with the movie theater experience has declined,
citing high ticket prices, boring commercials, rude behav-
ior among other patrons, and dirty theaters.
Second, box office revenues have reached this record
level primarily because of the large increases in ticket
prices. For instance, in 1930 the average ticket price was
$0.24, in 1990 it was $4.25, and in 2008 it was $7.18. In
major cities, the average movie ticket costs $11 on a
weekday and $13 on weekends, so, at these prices, many
consumers wait to see a film in DVD or on pay-per-view
in the comfort of their own homes.
Third, movie piracy, especially illegal downloads from
the Internet, affects revenue. The Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America (MPAA) estimates that more than 
$6.1 billion of revenue was lost because of piracy. While
most piracy occurs in China, Russia, and India, the U.S.
has its fair share. Piracy takes many forms, the most com-
mon being the unlawful release of a stolen print that is
then uploaded to a file-sharing site, such as Pirate Bay.
The most recent high-profile case of piracy involved the
film X-Men Origins: Wolverine. In early April 2009, an
almost completed, illegal copy leaked onto the Internet,
and approximately one million people illegally down-
loaded it. Fortunately for 20th Century Fox, the film had
a very strong box office weekend opening of $85 million.
Nevertheless, while hard to estimate, a great deal of rev-
enue was still lost because of piracy.
Assessing Different Formats and
Revenue Streams
Faced with a decline in patrons at the box office,
increased competition from other entertainment options,
and piracy of its content, the major studios are constantly
assessing new revenue streams. The main goal for any
entertainment company in these times is to develop con-
tent that can be distributed through as many channels as
possible. Currently, the major sources of revenue outside
theater releases come from home video, network, satellite
and cable television, international distribution, the Inter-
net, and mobile devices. In the following sections, we’ll
discuss the development and growth or decline of each of
these market segments.
Home Video
The development of home video in the mid-1970s as a
highly profitable post-theatrical release option funda-
mentally altered the economic structure of the film
industry and its market practices. Initially, the studios
priced their video releases for sale to video rental outlets
rather than to consumers. At $100 or more each, few
individuals could afford to purchase them. By 1986, the
major studios earned more revenue in the domestic
home video market through sales and rentals than they
did from theatrical release.
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The percentage of people who actually
go to a movie theater has declined
from a high of 65% of the population
in 1930 (before television) to about
10% over the last several decades. 
 
By 1990, movies were either rented or sold at much
more reasonable prices directly to consumers (known as
sell-through). Video rentals reached a plateau, but video
sell-through sales continued to grow. By 1992, the value of
video sell-through sales exceeded the domestic theatrical
box office for the first time. Home video caused a signifi-
cant downward shift in the box office; for instance, the
domestic box office represented 80% of studio revenues in
1980, but by 1992 it decreased to no more than 25%.
In 1997, the first DVD players were sold in the U.S.
DVDs quickly became the industry standard, and today
VHS tapes are no longer produced for new films. In 2006,
A History of Violence was the last VHS tape made of a
major feature film. According to Standard & Poor’s, DVD
sales in 2008 accounted for $16.2 billion, and DVD
rentals generated revenues of $7.5 billion. But DVD sales
are on the decline. Based on a 9% drop in 2008, Adams
Media Research projects that DVD sales will decline 8%
in 2009. The decline is attributed to the high price of
DVDs, the downturn in the economy, and the popularity
of DVD rental sites.
Industry analysts suggest that Blu-ray discs will replace
DVDs once the prices of Blu-ray players and Blu-ray discs
drop significantly. Yet market penetration of Blu-ray has
been much slower than anticipated. Some suggest that all
discs will be phased out and consumers will then obtain
their films by direct streaming from Internet sources like
Netflix, iTunes, and movielink or via satellite, thereby
avoiding any physical discs. No one knows if physical
discs will actually be completely phased out, though. For
years, LP records became obsolete as CDs became the
standard, but LPs are making a comeback as many con-
sumers believe the sound quality of records is more
authentic and pleasing.
Television
When television was born in the 1940s, the Hollywood
studios initially viewed it more as a threat than an oppor-
tunity, but eventually they discovered that it was quite
profitable to license movies to television. The six major
studios earned revenues of about $17.7 billion in 2005 by
licensing their movies and TV series to television net-
works and stations.
To maximize their television license revenue, studios
divide the licensing of their movies into discrete time
periods, known as “windows of exhibition.” Table 1
describes the six major windows, including four televi-
sion windows (pay-per-view, premium pay channels, net-
work and cable TV, and syndicated TV).
Video/DVD
As Table 1 shows, after the initial theatrical run, which
typically lasts from two weeks to six months, the next
window is for home video, which lasts up to six weeks
with guaranteed exclusivity. According to Larry Ger-
brandt, senior analyst at Paul Kagan & Associates, a little-
known secret in the home video rental market is that the
video rental companies make their largest profits from
late fees.
Pay-Per-View (PPV)
The next window is pay-per-view (PPV), which allows
subscribers to cable and satellite television to order
movies directly through a joint venture that licenses the
films from all the major studios. Initially this window was
timed to open about seven months after the theatrical
release to avoid delaying or competing with the video
release. But when studios began releasing the DVDs in
the late 1990s and their popularity soared, the window
had to be moved up when cable and satellite suppliers
complained that they received their movies too late to
compete with DVDs. Despite claims that PPV would pro-
vide another strong cash stream, the six studios’ revenues
from it have remained relatively modest.
Premium Pay Channels
The next window, which opens one year after the movie
appears in theaters, is premium pay channels. The three
major pay TV channels are HBO, Showtime, and Starz.
This window remains open for up to 18 months. The
licensing fee to show a major studio movie over a one-
year period is based on domestic box office performance
and can be as high as $20 million to $25 million for a
blockbuster, although the average is more like $7 million
per film.
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Network or Cable TV
The fifth window, which lasts between 12 and 18 months,
is network or free television. The networks and cable sta-
tions compete to determine who will obtain the rights to
broadcast each film and typically pay from $3 million to
$15 million for a movie, depending on the title’s box
office success and number of runs.
Syndicated TV
The final window is syndicated television stations, which
means that local stations can bid for the right to show the
movie and can air it for up to five years. In the largest TV
markets, studios may charge up to $5 million for syndi-
cated television rights to a strong film.
International Distribution
The international box office has accounted for slightly
less than half of the major studios’ total income from the-
atrical markets since the 1960s. The international market
for U.S. films continues to grow. Standard & Poor’s
estimates that, in 2008, foreign consumers spent nearly
$18 billion watching U.S. movies (the worldwide box
office is $28 billion, including nearly $10 billion of
domestic box office revenue). The largest foreign con-
sumers of films are those in the U.K., Japan, Germany,
France, Spain, and Australia/New Zealand. Of course, not
all of the $18 billion in revenues went to U.S. studios
because the exhibitors kept approximately 50% of box
office receipts.
Television licensing is equally profitable overseas. Stu-
dios typically sell their movies in blocks of six to 10 films
to foreign television networks. The license fee for the pack-
age is then allocated across the movies at the studio’s dis-
cretion. In 2003, overseas TV licensing was valued at
approximately $1.76 billion, half from conventional broad-
cast stations and networks and the other half from pay TV.
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The research we conducted for FAR involved two
stages. In the first stage, we gathered information
about the various revenue streams from published
sources as well as in-depth interviews with a number of
professionals working in the motion picture industry.
This research forms the foundation of the current arti-
cle. In the second stage, we conducted an empirical
study to determine which variables had the greatest
effect on cumulative box office. We found that two
variables, movie critics’ reviews as an indicator of prod-
uct quality and the amount of money spent on advertis-
ing the film, were the two most important factors
affecting the total (cumulative) box office receipts over
the theatrical run of the film. Our research also found
that cumulative domestic box office revenues positively
affect international box office revenues as well as home
video sales and rentals. Of note, the effects of the
domestic box office revenues on each downstream rev-
enue stream decrease as the time interval between the
theatrical release window and downstream windows
increases. Consistent with findings in the box office rev-
enue analysis, critics’ reviews have very strong positive
effects on all three downstream revenues.
We used a sample of 1,276 films from 1997 to 2003
and obtained film critic reviews from Entertainment
Weekly (EW), which publishes its own film critic
reviews, film opinion results from an online survey, and
critic reviews from other sources. EW reports eight or
nine critic reviews of the same film in one place over
three or more weeks. We calculated an overall indica-
tor of each week’s critic reviews collected from EW.
Merging the critic review data with the theatrical box
office data reduced our sample size to 856 films, which
we used to perform the domestic box office revenue
analyses.
We also collected advertising and production costs
on the films in our sample from the Motion Picture
Investor—a motion picture industry publication by Paul
Kagan & Associates that publishes these cost data
shortly after a film is released and then updates them in
the next year. We collected foreign box office revenues
and DVD/VHS rental revenues from various Internet
sources, including www.worldwideboxoffice.com. We
were able to obtain a proprietary database on DVD/VHS
sales under confidentiality conditions from one of the
six major motion picture studios. We also used a large
set of control variables, including film production cost,
actor and director star power, genre, original or sequel,
distributor, rating, and season and size of release. Many
of these variables are publicly observable features of the
film and thus may influence filmgoers’ expectations,
such as their perceptions of the film’s quality.
FAR Research Study
The overseas nontheatrical market grew in the late
1980s as a result of growth of cable and video, making
the home video market a larger source of overseas rev-
enue for Hollywood studios than the overseas theatrical
market in the 1990s. Standard & Poor’s predicts that the
overseas revenue from U.S. movies will increase to 
$41.6 billion by 2011.
Internet and Mobile Technology
As has been the case historically, new technology will
pave the way for perhaps the most significant revenue
streams yet to come. The rate at which the new technolo-
gy (such as smart phones) penetrates the market is the
limiting factor for new product proliferation, such as
downloadable movies. Hollywood has taken note of how
file sharing almost destroyed the music industry, and it is
now preparing to deal with a similar threat. Like their
experience with television, VHS, and DVD, the film
industry is trying to determine a new revenue-generating
model to exploit the Internet as a new revenue source.
The greatest concern is protecting copyright. Studios
fear that once they release a film online in digital format,
they will lose all control over its subsequent use and dis-
tribution. In one effort to maintain control over online
content, the studios are working with the computer
industry to build copy-protection technology into hard
drives. For instance, Microsoft’s Windows Vista contains
a DRM (digital rights management) system called the
Protected Media Path, which contains the Protected
Video Path (PVP). PVP tries to stop DRM-restricted
content from playing while unsigned software is running
in order to prevent the unsigned software from accessing
the content.
DVD rental companies and studios have come up with
a new business model, although it will take some time
before digital downloading and video-on-demand (VOD)
become significant revenue streams. Netflix and Block-
buster, through an alliance with TiVo, the digital video
recording service, are creating a digital entertainment ser-
vice that reportedly will allow customers to order a movie
online, which will then be loaded onto their TiVo sets,
providing DVD-quality movies on demand. Walt Disney
recently joined News Group and Universal Studios to
finance and supply content to Hulu.com, which Hulu
operates on a revenue-sharing basis with its content part-
ners. Walt Disney will not only supply archived TV pro-
grams but also titles from Disney’s movie library.
Consumers already can download films directly to
their iPods, BlackBerries, and other mobile devices. It’s
estimated that the number of those so-called smart
phones will reach 2.6 billion worldwide by 2011, so
movie downloads potentially offer a significant revenue
source for the studios, assuming they can put in place the
right business models. Predictions are hard to make, but
Screen Digest has estimated a potential $1.3 billion of rev-
enues from Internet movie downloads in the U.S. and
Western Europe in the next couple of years.
Exploiting Intellectual Property
Through analysis of the movie industry, we’ve illustrated
the roles of costs and revenues in a setting distinct from
traditional goods and service industries. Motion pictures
are just one of the information industries in which value
is created through knowledge and intellectual property.
Firms generate revenues by developing, selling, and
reselling the same content using different formats and in
different markets. For professionals in accounting and
finance, understanding and managing lifecycle costs and
revenues in knowledge-based industries such as motion
pictures can help them create value by exploiting intellec-
tual property. SF
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